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 NOTE 
Help Me, Help You: Eighth Circuit 
Diminishes Notice Requirement for 
Employees Seeking an ADA Accommodation 
Kowitz v. Trinity Health, 839 F.3d 742 (8th Cir. 2016) 
Rachel S. Kim* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of Title I of the American with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) is 
to remove barriers individuals with disabilities face in the workplace.1  In ad-
dition to prohibiting employers from discriminating against individuals with 
disabilities, the ADA also mandates an affirmative duty on employers to pro-
vide reasonable accommodations to disabled employees who need assistance 
in performing their jobs.2  Employers and employees share the responsibility 
of identifying an accommodation; they should work together through what is 
called an “interactive process” to find an accommodation that assists the em-
ployee in successfully performing his or her job and does not place an undue 
burden on the employer.3 
The ADA statute,4 legislative history,5 Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (“EEOC”) guidance,6 and Eighth Circuit precedent7 indicate that 
an employee seeking an accommodation must first request his or her need for 
an accommodation before the employer’s duty to engage in the interactive pro-
cess is triggered.  The Eighth Circuit, however, has not consistently held a uni-
 
*B.A., University of Missouri, 2014; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri School of 
Law, 2018; Associate Member, Missouri Law Review, 2017–2018. Thank you to Pro-
fessor Rafael Gely for his helpful edits and thoughtful advice, to the editors of the Mis-
souri Law Review, especially Abigail Williams for not only her support in preparing 
this Note but for encouraging me to join the Missouri Law Review. I am also grateful 
to my family and friends for their unwavering support. 
 1. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2012). 
 2. Id. § 12112(b). 
 3. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3) (2017). 
 4. Id. § 1630.2. 
 5. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, at 65 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 
348. 
 6. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630 (2017). 
 7. Fjellestad v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 188 F.3d 944, 952 (8th Cir. 1999). 
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form rule regarding what information an employer must have before it is obli-
gated to engage in the interactive process.8  In some cases, the Eighth Circuit 
has strictly required employees to clearly request an accommodation before 
any duty of the employer is triggered.9  In other cases, the Eighth Circuit has 
held as long as the employee provided enough information, combined with 
what the employer already knew about the employee’s limitations, the em-
ployer is sufficiently put on notice for the need for an accommodation.10  The 
Eighth Circuit took the latter approach in Kowitz v. Trinity Health.11 
This Note argues that the Eighth Circuit’s holding creates uncertainty for 
both employers and employees.  When deciding whether an employer has 
failed to engage in the interactive process, the Eighth Circuit should look to 
whether the employee clearly requested a need for an accommodation, rather 
than examining the totality of knowledge the employer had on hand.  Requiring 
employees to clearly request an accommodation puts employers on notice and 
thus helps employers better help employees with disabilities.  Part II of this 
Note provides the facts and holding of Kowitz.  Part III examines the legal 
background surrounding Kowitz.  Part IV reviews the instant decision of the 
court.  Part V explains why employees should be required to clearly request a 
desire for an accommodation, as well as provides guidance for employers mov-
ing forward.  Part VI concludes this Note. 
II.  FACTS AND HOLDING 
In March of 2007, Roberta Kowitz began employment at Trinity Health.12  
Trinity Health is a non-profit, integrated healthcare system that provides a va-
riety of healthcare services to people in North Dakota and surrounding areas.13  
Kowitz was initially hired as a respiratory therapist in the cardiopulmonary 
department but later assumed duties as a lead technician in the blood gas labor-
atory.14  Her direct supervisor was Douglas Reinertson, and Reinertson’s direct 
supervisor was Mark Waldera.15 
Kowitz suffered from cervical spinal stenosis, a degenerative disease of 
the spine.16  This spinal disease required her to have corrective neck surgery.17  
 
 8. Craig A. Sullivan, The ADA’s Interactive Process, 57 J. Mo. B. 116, 118–19 
(2001). 
 9. See Kowitz v. Trinity Health, 839 F.3d 742, 747 (8th Cir. 2016); see also Mole 
v. Buckhorn Rubber Prods., Inc., 165 F.3d 1212, 1218 (8th Cir. 1999). 
 10. Cannice v. Norwest Bank Iowa N.A., 189 F.3d 723, 727 (8th Cir. 1999). 
 11. Kowitz, 839 F.3d 742. 
 12. Id. at 744. 
 13. About Trinity Health, TRINITY HEALTH, http://trinityhealth.org/about (last vis-
ited May 29, 2018). 
 14. Kowitz, 839 F.3d at 744. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
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Kowitz requested leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act18 (“FMLA”) 
from July 27, 2010, through September 10, 2010.19  Trinity Health granted her 
request.20  On September 7, 2010, Kowitz’s physician recommended she not 
return to work until October 18, 2010.21  Kowitz thus requested an extension 
of leave through October 19, 2010.22  Trinity granted the extension.23  With the 
extension, Kowitz had exhausted the remainder of her FMLA leave.24 
When Kowitz returned to work, she provided Trinity with a Return to 
Work Form, outlining her physical limitations.25  In addition, she told Reinert-
son that she would be unable to work full twelve-hour shifts until approved to 
do so by her physician.26  Reinertson assigned Kowitz to work eight-hour shifts 
instead but told her that Trinity would not be able to reduce her shifts indefi-
nitely.27 
On November 19, 2010, Trinity Health announced that all cardiopulmo-
nary department employees were required to provide updated copies of their 
basic life support (“BLS”) certifications by November 26, 2010.28  A BLS cer-
tification renewal “required taking a written examination and performing a 
physical demonstration of CPR.”29  On November 30, 2010, Kowitz informed 
Reinertson that she would be unable to perform a physical demonstration of 
CPR until cleared to do so by her physician.30 
On December 2, 2010, Kowitz called Reinertson to inform him that her 
physician instructed she complete, at minimum, four months of physical ther-
apy before she could complete the physical portion of the BLS examination.31  
The next day, Kowitz was terminated for not being able to perform BLS.32  
 
 18. See Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. § 2601 (2012). 
 19. Kowitz, 839 F.3d at 744. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. (Kowitz’s Return to Work Form stated that “up until November 29, 2010, 
Kowitz would be restricted to working eight-hour shifts, and lifting, carrying, pulling, 
or pushing no more than ten pounds, among other restrictions.”). 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. (Reinertson posted a memorandum that stated, “If you are not up to date 
on your BLS you will need to submit a letter indicating why you are not up to date and 
the date you are scheduled to take the BLS class.”). 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. at 744–45 (Kowitz submitted a letter to Reinertson informing him that she 
would not be able to do the physical part of BLS until she had clearance from her doc-
tor.). 
 31. Id. at 745. 
 32. Id. 
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Kowitz subsequently brought suit against Trinity Health, Reinertson, and Wal-
dera under the ADA33 and the North Dakota Human Rights Act34 (“NDHRA”), 
alleging that they discriminated against her when they terminated her employ-
ment and failed to accommodate her disability.35 
Kowitz asserted that Trinity failed to accommodate her because Trinity 
should have allowed her additional time to complete her BLS certification or 
reassigned her to another position that did not require the certification.36  Trin-
ity argued that “Kowitz was not a qualified individual under the ADA, because 
performing BLS was an essential function of both of her positions.”37  Further-
more, Trinity contended that Kowitz never requested an accommodation.38 
The district court agreed with Trinity and granted summary judgment, 
holding that Kowitz was not qualified to perform the essential functions of ei-
ther of her positions.39  In addition, the district court concluded that because 
Kowitz produced no evidence that she ever requested an accommodation for 
her inability to perform BLS, Trinity was under no obligation to allow her ad-
ditional time to complete her BLS certification or to reassign her to another 
position that did not require the certification.40  Kowitz appealed to the Eighth 
Circuit.41 
The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of summary judg-
ment and held that: (1) BLS certification was an essential function of Kowitz’s 
positions and (2) a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether Kowitz 
requested an accommodation.42  The court noted that although Kowitz did not 
explicitly request an accommodation, she did notify her supervisors that she 
would not be able to obtain certification until completing physical therapy and 
Trinity was aware of her disability and her general limitations.43  The Eighth 
Circuit concluded that where an employee provides enough information that 
under the circumstances the employer can fairly be said to know of the disabil-
ity and desire for an accommodation, a genuine issue of material fact exists as 
to whether that employee requested an accommodation sufficient to trigger the 
employer’s duty to engage in the interactive process of identifying a reasonable 
accommodation.44 
 
 33. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2012). 
 34. See N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 14-02.4-03.1 (West 2018). 
 35. Kowitz, 839 F.3d at 745. 
 36. Id. at 746. 
 37. Id. at 745. 
 38. Id. at 746. 
 39. Id. at 745. 
 40. Id. at 746. 
 41. Id. at 744. 
 42. Id. at 746, 748. 
 43. Id. at 747. 
 44. Id. at 748. 
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III.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The ADA is “among the most wide-ranging civil rights statutes that were 
passed in the 20th century.”45  Not only does the ADA prohibit discrimination 
based on disability, but it mandates affirmative duties for employers to make 
necessary changes in operations so that disabled individuals enjoy the same 
rights as others.46  Kowitz v. Trinity Health deals with this unique concept of 
the ADA.  To gain a better understanding of the legal background of Kowitz, 
Section A of this Part provides an overview of the ADA and the reasonable 
accommodation requirement, Section B explores the legislative history and 
EEOC guidance regarding the reasonable accommodation and interactive pro-
cess concepts, and Section C examines Eighth Circuit case law. 
A.  Overview of the ADA and Reasonable Accommodation                
Requirement 
Nearly a quarter-century after passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,47 
Congress began discussing the possible extension of civil rights protection to 
individuals with disabilities.48  ADA legislation swiftly passed both the House 
and Senate, and it was signed into law by President George H.W. Bush on July 
26, 1990.49  The ADA’s stated purpose is “to provide a clear and comprehen-
sive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals 
with disabilities.”50 
The statute notes that, due to the lack of antidiscrimination laws, people 
with disabilities have been precluded from being able to fully thrive in the 
workplace and beyond because of discrimination.51  Title I of the ADA specif-
ically prohibits employers from discriminating against individuals with disa-
bilities.52  Employers with more than fifteen employees are subject to Title I 
 
 45. PETER A. SUSSER, DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION AND THE WORKPLACE 2 
(2005). 
 46. Id. 
 47. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964). 
 48. SUSSER, supra note 45, at 7. 
 49. Id. at 12. 
 50. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (2012). 
 51. Id. § 12101. 
 52. See id. § 12112 (2012). 
 
The term “disability” means, with respect to an individual –  
 
(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more 
major life activities of such individual; 
 
(B) a record of such an impairment; or 
 
(C) being regarded as having such an impairment. 
5
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requirements.53  In general, employers may not discriminate against an indi-
vidual on the basis of disability in regards to “job application procedures, the 
hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job 
training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.”54  The 
elements a plaintiff must show to prevail on a claim under Title I of the ADA 
are: (1) she is disabled within the meaning of the statute; (2) she is qualified to 
perform the essential functions of the job, with or without reasonable accom-
modation; and (3) she suffered an adverse employment action due to her disa-
bility.55 
Furthermore, Title I requires employers to make reasonable accommoda-
tions to disabled individuals that need assistance to successfully perform their 
jobs.56  The nature of the reasonable accommodation obligation is as follows: 
employers are obligated to provide reasonable accommodations that allow oth-
erwise qualified individuals to perform the essential functions of their jobs so 
long as such accommodation does not create an “undue hardship”57 for the em-
ployer.58  That obligation extends to all aspects of employment, such as hiring, 
discharge, and advancement.59  The reasonable accommodation requirement is 
arguably the most unique concept of the ADA.60  While other federal antidis-
crimination statutes focus on equal treatment of individuals based on race, sex, 
and age,61 the ADA goes further by placing an affirmative duty on employers 
to identify and provide reasonable accommodations to individuals with disa-
bilities.62  Although employers are obligated to reasonably accommodate reli-
gious beliefs and practices as required by the Civil Rights Act of 1964,63 the 
ADA creates requirements that are far more reaching.64 
Because employers are only obligated to accommodate a “qualified indi-
vidual with a disability,”65 the first inquiry is whether the individual-employee 
is “qualified.”  Under the ADA, for a person to be a qualified individual, she 
 
Id. § 12102 (2012). 
 53. Id. § 12111(5)(A). 
 54. Id. § 12112(a). 
 55. Wenzel v. Mo.-Am. Water Co., 404 F.3d 1038, 1040 (8th Cir. 2005). 
 56. § 12112(b)(5)(A). 
 57. The term “undue hardship” means an action requiring significant difficulty or 
expense, when considered in light of the facts set forth in subparagraph (B).  Id. § 
12111(10)(A). 
 58. See id. § 12112(b)(5)(A); id. § 12111(8). 
 59. Id. § 12112(a). 
 60. SUSSER, supra note 45, at 2, 12, 21. 
 61. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2012) (Except 
for religion, employers not required to accommodate protected individuals under Title 
VII or the ADEA.). 
 62. SUSSER, supra note 45, at 2. 
 63. § 2000e(j). 
 64. SUSSER, supra note 45, at 21 (“[T]he ADA impose[s] an affirmative duty on 
employers to provide special and unique treatment to disabled individuals.”). 
 65. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2012). 
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must (1) possess the requisite skill, education, and other job-related require-
ments for the position and (2) be able to perform the essential functions of the 
position desired or held, with or without reasonable accommodation.66  Essen-
tial functions are “the fundamental job duties of the employment position the 
individual with a disability holds or desires.”67 
The determination of whether a function is essential requires considera-
tion of: (1) “‘whether the employer actually requires employees in the position 
to perform the functions that the employer asserts are essential’” and (2) 
“‘whether removing the function would fundamentally alter that position.’”68  
The inquiry is fact-specific and requires evaluating several factors, such as how 
much time the employee spends performing the function, the employer’s judg-
ment as to which functions are essential, and written job descriptions prepared 
before advertising or interviewing applicants for the job.69  If an employee is 
unable to perform an essential job function, then she is not a “qualified indi-
vidual” and is therefore disqualified from ADA protection.70 
Furthermore, the ADA only requires an employer to make accommoda-
tions for known limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disabil-
ity.71  Therefore, an employee must notify his or her employer that he or she 
needs or desires an accommodation.72  After an employee requests a need for 
an accommodation, the ADA requires the employer to: 
initiate an informal, interactive process with the individual with a disa-
bility in need of the accommodation.  This process should identify the 
precise limitations resulting from the disability and potential reasonable 
accommodations that could overcome those limitations.73 
The regulations allude to employers having an obligation to engage in an “in-
teractive process”; however, it is unclear what this interactive process should 
look like.  Courts have relied on the legislative histories of the ADA and EEOC 
regulations for guidance.74 
 
 66. Kowitz v. Trinity Health, 839 F.3d 742, 745 (8th Cir. 2016); see also 29 C.F.R. 
§ 1630.2(m) (2017). 
 67. § 1630.2(n)(1). 
 68. SUSSER, supra note 45, at 778–79 (quoting 29 C.F.R. app. 1630 (2003)). 
 69. § 1630.2(n). 
 70. See § 12112(b)(5)(A). 
 71. See id. 
 72. SUSSER, supra note 45, at 23. 
 73. § 1630.2(o)(3). 
 74. The EEOC “is responsible for enforcing federal laws that make it illegal to 
discriminate against a job applicant or an employee because of the person’s race, color, 
religion, sex (including pregnancy, gender identity, and sexual orientation), national 
origin, age (40 or older), disability or genetic information.”  Overview, U.S. EQUAL 
EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/ (last visited May 30, 
2018). 
7
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B.  Legislative History and EEOC Regulations Regarding the            
Interactive Process 
The legislative history of the ADA reveals that Congress intended em-
ployers and employees to engage in the interactive process in which possible 
accommodations are identified to provide an equal opportunity for an individ-
ual with a disability.75  Congress specified that this process is triggered only 
after the employee requests an accommodation, given that “people with disa-
bilities may have a lifetime of experience identifying ways to accomplish tasks 
differently in many different circumstances” and, therefore, “will know exactly 
what accommodation.”76 Congress indicated that there are times when neither 
the employer nor employee knows what the appropriate accommodation is be-
cause the employer is not familiar enough with the individual’s disability and 
the employee is not familiar enough with the job in question.77  Therefore, the 
employer should initiate an informal, four-step interactive process to identify 
and provide an appropriate accommodation.78 
The first step requires an employer to “identify barriers to equal oppor-
tunity.”79  This step may include identifying and distinguishing between essen-
tial and nonessential tasks of the relevant position and consulting with the em-
ployee to identify the abilities and limitations of the individual.80  The second 
step is to search for and evaluate potential accommodations.81  The employer 
may have to consult with the disabled employee.82  After identifying possible 
accommodations, the third step is to determine the reasonableness of such ac-
commodations.83  Factors to consider when determining the reasonableness of 
potential accommodations include effectiveness, reliability, and timeliness.84  
The fourth and final step is to provide the accommodation that is “most appro-
priate for the employee and the employer and that does not impose an undue 
hardship on the employer’s operation or to permit the employee to provide his 
or her own accommodation if it does impose an undue hardship.”85 
The EEOC Appendix to the ADA provides guidance regarding the pro-
cess of determining an appropriately reasonable accommodation, consistent 
with legislative intent.  The Appendix states that “it may be necessary for the 
employer to initiate a more defined problem solving process, such as the step-
 
 75. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, at 65 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 
348. 
 76. Id. at 65–66. 
 77. Id. at 66. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
8
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by-step process described above, as part of its reasonable effort to identify the 
appropriate reasonable accommodation.”86  The EEOC suggests a four-step 
problem-solving approach, like the one suggested in the House report.  When 
an employee requests an accommodation, an employer should: 
(1) Analyze the particular job involved and determine its purpose 
and essential functions; 
(2) Consult with the individual with a disability to ascertain the pre-
cise job-related limitations imposed by the individual’s disability and 
how those limitations could be overcome with a reasonable accommo-
dation; 
(3) In consultation with the individual to be accommodated, identify 
potential accommodations and assess the effectiveness each would have 
in enabling the individual to perform the essential functions of the po-
sition; and 
(4) Consider the preference of the individual to be accommodated 
and select and implement the accommodation that is most appropriate 
for both the employee and the employer.87 
Unlike the House report, the EEOC does not indicate whether employers are 
always required to engage in the interactive process, as the EEOC suggests “it 
may be necessary for the employer.”88  Furthermore, if employers are required 
to participate in the interactive process, the employer’s liability for failure to 
participate remains uncertain. 
C.  Eighth Circuit Case Law 
1.  Prima Facie Case of Failure to Participate in Interactive Process 
After the EEOC released its interpretive guidelines, it was still unclear 
whether employers were required to engage in the interactive process.89  Most 
courts have indicated that employers are required to engage in the interactive 
process with qualified individuals,90 while some courts have held there is no 
 
 86. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630 (2017). 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. (emphasis added). 
 89. Compare 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3) (2017) (“To determine the appropriate rea-
sonable accommodation it may be necessary for the covered entity to initiate an infor-
mal, interactive process . . . .” (emphasis added)), with 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630 (“[T]he 
employer must make a reasonable effort to determine the appropriate accommodation.” 
(emphasis added)). 
 90. See, e.g., Humphrey v. Memorial Hosps. Ass’n, 239 F.3d 1128, 1137 (9th Cir. 
2001); Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 296, 312 (3rd Cir. 1999); Taylor v. 
9
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per se liability under the ADA if an employer fails to engage in the interactive 
process.91  The Eighth Circuit took a middle-ground approach in Fjellestad v. 
Pizza Hut of America, Inc.92  In this case, the Eighth Circuit agreed with other 
circuits that held there is no per se liability if an employer fails to engage in the 
interactive process;93 however, for summary judgment purposes, “the failure 
of an employer to engage in an interactive process to determine whether rea-
sonable accommodations are possible is prima facie evidence that the employer 
may be acting in bad faith.”94 
The Eighth Circuit ruled that an employer will not be held liable if no 
reasonable accommodation is possible but “a factual question exists as to 
whether the employer has attempted to provide reasonable accommodation as 
required by the ADA.”95  The Eighth Circuit followed the Third Circuit’s anal-
ysis illustrated in Taylor v. Phoenixville School District.96  Once an employee 
requests an accommodation, the employer’s duty to engage in the interactive 
process is triggered.97  An employee arguing her employer failed to participate 
in the interactive process must demonstrate the following: 
1) the employer knew about the employee’s disability; 2) the employee 
requested accommodations or assistance for his or her disability; 3) the 
employer did not make a good faith effort to assist the employee in 
seeking accommodations; and 4) the employee could have been reason-
ably accommodated but for the employer’s lack of good faith.98 
2.  Request for Accommodation 
The Eighth Circuit has repeatedly held that the employee is responsible 
for requesting an accommodation before the employer is required to provide 
accommodation or engage in the interactive process.99  While it is clear that the 
 
Principal Fin. Grp., Inc., 93 F.3d 155, 165 (5th Cir. 1996) (noting that “the responsibil-
ity for fashioning a reasonable accommodation is shared between the employee and 
employer”). 
 91. See, e.g., Beck v. Univ. of Wis. Bd. of Regents, 75 F.3d 1130, 1135 (7th Cir. 
1996); Taylor, 93 F.3d at 165. 
 92. See Fjellestad v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 188 F.3d 944 (8th Cir. 1999). 
 93. Id. at 952. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. (quoting Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 174 F.3d 142, 165 (3d Cir.), 
vacated, 184 F.3d 296 (1999)). 
 99. See id. (“The guidelines set forth the predicate requirement that when the dis-
abled individual requests accommodation, it becomes necessary to initiate the interac-
tive process.”); EEOC. v. Convergys Customer Mgmt. Grp., Inc., 491 F.3d 790, 795 
(8th Cir. 2007) (“A disabled employee must initiate the accommodation-seeking pro-
cess by making his employer aware of the need for an accommodation.”); Wallin v. 
10
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employee is responsible for requesting an accommodation,100 it is unclear as to 
what information the employer must have before its duty to engage in the in-
teractive process is triggered. 
In Fjellestad, the Eighth Circuit stated that “notice must merely make it 
clear to the employer that the employee wants assistance for his or her disabil-
ity.”101  However, the same year the Eighth Circuit decided Fjellestad, the court 
also decided Mole v. Buckhorn, where it held that a general request for accom-
modation was insufficient, as “only [the employee] could accurately identify 
the need for accommodations specific to her job and workplace.”102  Further-
more, employees “cannot expect the employer to read [her] mind and know 
[she] secretly wanted a particular accommodation and [then] sue the employer 
for not providing it.”103 
In some cases, the Eighth Circuit has analyzed the sufficiency of the em-
ployer’s knowledge based on the “totality of the knowledge” the employer had 
at hand.104  The “totality of knowledge” approach examines not only what the 
employee stated at the time he or she requested an accommodation but also 
what the employer already knew about the employee.105  In Cannice v. Norwest 
Bank Iowa, the Eighth Circuit considered what prior communications the em-
ployee had with his employer and other instances in which the employer was 
aware of the employee’s disability and need for an accommodation.106  On the 
contrary, in EEOC v. Product Fabricators, the Eighth Circuit rejected the 
plaintiff’s failure to accommodate claim because the plaintiff failed to show 
 
Minn. Dep’t of Corr., 153 F.3d 681, 689 (8th Cir. 1998) (“In general, it is the respon-
sibility of the individual with a disability to inform the employer that an accommoda-
tion is needed.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.9 
(1992))); Cannice v. Norwest Bank Iowa N.A., 189 F.3d 723, 727 (8th Cir. 1999) (“In 
order to be entitled to an accommodation, the employee must inform the employer that 
an accommodation is needed.”). 
 100. Ballard v. Rubin, 284 F.3d 957, 961–62 (quoting Taylor, 174 F.3d at 159). 
 
The EEOC’s manual makes clear . . . that while the notice does not have to be 
in writing, be made by the employee, or formally invoke the magic words ‘rea-
sonable accommodation,’ the notice nonetheless must make clear that the em-
ployee wants assistance for his or her disability. 
 
Id. (quoting Taylor, 174 F.3d at 158–59). 
 101. Fjellestad, 188 F.3d at 952 n.5.  Plaintiff clearly requested: “I request that I be 
reasonably accommodated.”  Id. at 952. 
 102. Mole v. Buckhorn Rubber Prods., Inc., 165 F.3d 1212, 1218 (8th Cir. 1999). 
 103. Id. (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Ferry 
v. Roosevelt Bank, 883 F. Supp. 435, 441 (E.D. Mo. 1995)). 
 104. Sullivan, supra note 8, at 118. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 119; see also Cannice v. Norwest Bank Iowa N.A., 189 F.3d 723, 727 
(8th Cir. 1999). 
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that he specifically requested an accommodation.107  Like in Cannice, the em-
ployer was already aware the employee had a disability because the employee 
had received workers’ compensation for injury and disability, and the em-
ployee had notified his supervisor that his shoulder “was causing him pain” 
and he might have to take off for surgery.108  But the Eighth Circuit came out 
with the opposite holding.  Based on the circuit’s precedent, there is no uniform 
rule regarding what information an employer must have before its obligation 
to engage in the interactive process is triggered. 
IV.  INSTANT DECISION 
A.  Majority Opinion 
The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision and remanded for 
further proceeding.  Judge Jane Kelly, writing for the majority, reasoned that 
Kowitz provided enough information to show that under the circumstances 
Trinity knew of the disability and desire for an accommodation.109  The district 
court concluded that (1) Kowitz was not qualified to perform the essential func-
tions of her job, and (2) Trinity Health had no duty to reassign Kowitz to an 
alternative position.110  Kowitz appealed the district court’s grant of summary 
judgment in favor of Trinity Health.111 
1. Essential Function 
The Eighth Circuit held that there was no genuine issue of material fact 
as to whether BLS certification was an essential function of Kowitz’s position 
based on the following: Kowitz’s job description for lead technician stated that 
BLS certification is required, testimony stating that respiratory therapists were 
expected to perform BLS, and every respiratory therapist except for Kowitz 
was certified by the November 26, 2010 deadline.112 After determining BLS 
certification was an essential function of Kowitz’s position, the Eighth Circuit 
discussed the main issue of the case – whether Kowitz could perform this es-
sential job function with an accommodation and, if so, whether Trinity failed 
to reasonably accommodate her.113 
 
 107. EEOC v. Prod. Fabricators, Inc., 763 F.3d 963, 967–68, 971 (8th Cir. 2014). 
 108. Id. at 968. 
 109. Kowitz v. Trinity Health, 839 F.3d 742, 748 (8th Cir. 2016). 
 110. Id. at 745. 
 111. Id. at 744. 
 112. Id. at 745–46. 
 113. Id. at 746. 
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2. Request for a Reasonable Accommodation 
The majority found that there was sufficient evidence to preclude sum-
mary judgment as to whether Kowitz requested a reasonable accommoda-
tion.114  Kowitz told her supervisor in writing that she was unable to fulfill the 
physical portion of the BLS examination.115  In addition, Kowitz called her 
supervisor and left a voicemail informing him that she had to complete at least 
four months of physical therapy before she could obtain the certification.116  
Furthermore, the court determined there were other facts that revealed that 
Trinity should have understood Kowitz’s communications to be a request for a 
reasonable accommodation.117 
According to the court, her notification to her supervisor stating that she 
would have to complete physical therapy “implied that an accommodation 
would be required until then.”118  The court noted that other cases where the 
Eighth Circuit held an employer’s duty to accommodate an employee is not 
triggered until the employee clearly requests an accommodation were much 
more “ambiguous.”119 
The Eighth Circuit stated that Kowitz was only required to “provide[] the 
employer with enough information that, under the circumstances, the employer 
can be fairly said to know of both the disability and desire for an accommoda-
tion.”120  This includes the “employer’s knowledge of the disability and the 
employee’s prior communications about the disability, and is not limited to the 
precise words spoken by the employee at the time of the request.”121 
According to the majority, because Kowitz made Trinity Health aware 
that she could not perform BLS until she completed physical therapy and Trin-
ity Health was already aware of her disability and the general nature of her 
limitations, a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether Kowitz re-
quested an accommodation sufficient to trigger Trinity Health’s duty to engage 
in the interactive process of identifying a reasonable accommodation. 
B.  Dissenting Opinion 
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Steven M. Colloton stated he would af-
firm the judgment of the district court.122  Judge Colloton contended that the 
 
 114. Id. at 747. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. (discussing that Trinity should have been aware of Kowitz’s need for ac-
commodation based on her prior FMLA leave, the information in her Return to Work 
Form, and comments to her supervisor indicating she was still experiencing neck pain). 
 118. Id. (emphasis added). 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 748 (alteration in original) (quoting Ballard v. Rubin, 284 F.3d 957, 962 
(8th Cir. 2002)). 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. (Colloton, J., dissenting). 
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majority’s decision “conflates the employer’s knowledge of an employee’s dis-
ability with the requirement that an employee must make a clear request for 
accommodation.”123 
Judge Colloton argued that Kowitz’s claim for failure to accommodate 
fails because she did not clearly request an accommodation.124  She merely 
notified Trinity that she could not complete the physical portion of the BLS 
examination until she completed at least four months of physical therapy.125  
While such a notification “can be said in some sense to have made her em-
ployer ‘aware of the need for an accommodation,’” the court has never held 
that “notifying the employer of a disability is an ‘implied’ request . . . sufficient 
to trigger an employer’s duty to engage in the interactive process,” according 
to Judge Colloton.126 
Judge Colloton pointed out that the law requires employees to clearly no-
tify their employers that they desire an accommodation.127  By eliminating the 
predicate requirement to initiate the interactive process, Judge Colloton as-
serted the majority decision creates great uncertainty for employers and em-
ployees.128  Judge Colloton concluded that because Kowitz never clearly re-
quested an accommodation, there was no genuine issue of fact concerning 
whether Kowitz requested an accommodation.129 
V.  COMMENT 
The Eighth Circuit’s holding diminishes what the court has commonly 
called the “predicate requirement,” or the requirement that employees clearly 
notify their employers that they desire accommodation.   Rather than consider-
ing whether Kowitz requested an accommodation, the court examined the “to-
tality of knowledge” Trinity had on hand.130  Because the “totality of 
knowledge” approach creates great uncertainty and is not in the best interest of 
both employers and employees, this Note argues that when deciding whether 
an employer failed to engage in the interactive process, courts should examine 
whether the employee clearly requested a need for an accommodation, rather 
than analyzing the totality of knowledge the employer had on hand.  Section A 
of this Part explains why this rule is illogical and analyzes the burdens this rule 
will have on employers and employees.  Given the current ambiguity of the 
law, Section B of this Part provides guidance to employers moving forward.  
 
 123. Id. at 750. 
 124. Id. at 749 (To prove an employer failed to make a reasonable accommodation, 
an employee must show “(1) that the employer knew about her disability, and (2) that 
she requested an accommodation or assistance for her disability.”). 
 125. Id. at 748–49. 
 126. Id. at 750. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. See id. 
 130. See id. at 748. 
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Specifically, Section B reviews Trinity’s mistakes so employers can avoid fall-
ing into similar pitfalls in the future. 
A.  Employees Should Clearly Request a Need for an Accommodation 
An employee should not be allowed to prevail on an accommodation 
claim where an employee only notified his or her employer of the disability 
because it does not give the employer proper notice of a need for an accommo-
dation. The totality of knowledge approach taken by the Eighth Circuit “con-
flates the employer’s knowledge of an employee’s disability with the require-
ment that an employee must make a clear request for accommodation.”131  Em-
ployers will be uncertain when their obligation to engage in the interactive pro-
cess is triggered, as any knowledge of disability may trigger that obligation.132  
This is problematic because any employee who notifies his or her employer 
that he or she cannot work because of a disability can be said to have made the 
employer “aware of the need for an accommodation.”133  Furthermore, as noted 
above, the ADA is unique compared to other federal antidiscrimination statutes 
because it not only focuses on equal treatment of individuals with protected 
characteristics but also places an affirmative duty on employers to identify and 
provide reasonable accommodations.  Further obligating employers to assume 
when an accommodation is needed is an enormous and unreasonable burden. 
On the other hand, it is not overly burdensome to require employees seek-
ing an accommodation to clearly request such accommodation because em-
ployees with disabilities possess the most information regarding their disabili-
ties and limitations.  Kowitz alleged that she desired to be moved to a different 
position but she never made this request known.134  There was no way for Trin-
ity to know that Kowitz desired to be transferred, yet the Eighth Circuit held 
that a reasonable jury could find that Trinity understood Kowitz’s communica-
tions to be a request for accommodation, thus triggering Trinity’s duty to en-
gage in the interactive process.135 
When enacting the ADA, Congress noted that, compared to employers, 
employees are in a better position to request accommodations because individ-
uals with disabilities usually have a “lifetime of experience identifying ways to 
accomplish tasks differently in many different circumstances.”136  Although an 
employee is not required to request any specific accommodation, he or she will 
typically know “exactly what accommodation he or she will need to perform 
 
 131. Id. at 750. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. at 749–50; Brief of Appellees Trinity Health, Doughlas Reinerston, & 
Mark Waldera at 21–22, Kowitz, 839 F.3d 742 (No. 15-1584). 
 135. See Kowitz, 839 F.3d at 747. 
 136. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, at 65–66 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
303, 348. 
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successfully in a particular job.”137  Congress further noted that the employee’s 
suggested accommodation is often simpler and less expensive than any accom-
modation the employer may have devised.138 
It would not have been an onerous burden on Kowitz to require her to 
clearly request her desired accommodation.  Consistent with legislative find-
ings, Kowitz was in the best position to disclose that she desired an accommo-
dation, and in this case, she was in the best position to disclose exactly what 
accommodation she desired.  An employee who already knows that he or she 
desires a specific accommodation should not wait for his or her employer to 
identify the accommodation.  The majority’s holding seems to be at odds with 
the concerns raised in Mole – an employee cannot “expect the employer to read 
[her] mind and know [she] secretly wanted a particular accommodation and 
[then] sue the employer for not providing it.”139 
An employer’s duty to identify an accommodation should not be triggered 
until an employee has clearly requested a need for accommodation, but there 
are some policy arguments for why the full burden should not be placed on the 
employee.  One argument against placing the full burden on employees to dis-
close is that employers are likely to be “repeat players”;140 therefore, it would 
not be burdensome to expect employers to identify when an employee needs 
an accommodation.  While employers are typically familiar with the ADA and 
accommodation process, expecting employers to assume when an accommo-
dation is needed is still burdensome.  The ADA specifically contends that it is 
inappropriate for employers to provide accommodation in the absence of re-
quest.141  It would be inconsistent with that prohibition to require employers to 
“anticipate all the problems that a disability may create on the job and sponta-
neously accommodate them.”142 
This Note does not claim that it would have been wrong for Trinity to 
begin identifying accommodation possibilities for Kowitz, rather an em-
ployer’s duty to identify an accommodation should not be triggered until the 
employee has clearly requested a need for an accommodation.  As the dissent-
ing opinion indicated, it is inappropriate to “impose a rule based on how a be-
 
 137. Id. at 66. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Mole v. Buckhorn Rubber Prods., Inc., 165 F.3d 1212, 1218 (8th Cir. 1999) 
(alterations in original) (quoting Ferry v. Roosevelt Bank, 883 F. Supp. 435, 441 (E.D. 
Mo. 1995)). 
 140. The term “repeat players” is typically used in an employment arbitration con-
text.  But in this case, employers would be considered “repeat players” because most 
employers are familiar with complying with the ADA. 
 141. SUSSER, supra note 45, at 785–86. 
 142. Sullivan, supra note 8, at 119 (quoting Loulseged v. Akzo Nobel, Inc., 178 
F.3d 731, 736 (5th Cir. 1999)). 
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neficent employer would treat an employee who notifies the employer of a dis-
ability, even if some employers might well take it upon themselves to initiate 
the interactive process without a request from the employee.”143 
A second reason against placing the full burden on employees is that even 
if employees are in the better position to disclose, some employees – specifi-
cally individuals with mental disabilities – may be hesitant or unable to dis-
close.  While a valid concern, Congress addressed the problem.  The general 
rule is that employers should not make disability-related inquires as to whether 
an employee requires a reasonable accommodation.144  However, an exception 
to this rule is made when the employer: (1) knows that the employee has a 
disability; (2) knows, or has reason to know, that the employee is experiencing 
workplace problems because of the disability; and (3) knows, or has reason to 
know, that the disability prevents the employee from requesting an accommo-
dation.145  If the preceding elements are met, the employer should initiate the 
interactive process without being asked by the employee.146  Because the law 
addresses the concern regarding individuals unable to disclose, employees 
should clearly request a need for an accommodation before the employer’s duty 
to engage in the interactive process is triggered.  
Requiring employees to unequivocally request accommodations to trig-
ger the interactive process does not eliminate employers’ affirmative duty to 
identify and provide accommodations, nor does it in any way nullify the inter-
active process.  Employers always hold the duty to initiate the interactive pro-
cess.  Employees should be the ones to put employers on notice as employees 
are in the best position to disclose.  The more clearly an employee communi-
cates his or her request, the more likely employers are to recognize the em-
ployee’s need or desire for an ADA accommodation.  The nature of the inter-
active process is a “help me, help you” process.  Employers can better “help” 
employees with disabilities when employees clearly request accommodations. 
B.  Guidance for Employers 
Kowitz provides important lessons to employers regarding their responsi-
bilities to identify and provide accommodations.  First, employers should be 
cautious if they already know of an employee’s disability due to the employee 
taking FMLA leave.  Second, timing of the employer’s knowledge of the em-
 
 143. Kowitz v. Trinity Health, 839 F.3d 742, 750 (8th Cir. 2016) (Colloton, J., dis-
senting). 
 144. SUSSER, supra note 45, at 790. 
 145. Id. 
      146. U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, 915.002, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE: 
REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION AND UNDUE HARDSHIP UNDER THE AMERICANS WITH 
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ployee’s disability and request for accommodation is critical.  Trinity was al-
ready aware of Kowitz’s disability, as she had previously taken FMLA leave 
and provided information of her limitations in her Return to Work form.147   
The first lesson of Kowitz is that employers should be cautious if they 
have knowledge of an employee’s disability due to the employee taking FMLA 
leave.  The EEOC has provided guidance stating that if an employee requests 
leave for a reason related or possibility related to a disability, the employer 
should consider both a request for FMLA and ADA accommodation.148  Em-
ployers should analyze employees’ rights under each statute separately when 
determining the appropriate action to take.149  The EEOC further provides that 
employers should be “sensitive that apparently routine conversations might 
trigger the ADA’s duty to accommodate, especially if the employer already has 
information concerning the employee’s medical conditions from records pro-
vided to it pursuant to . . . the FMLA, or otherwise.”150 
The importance of this guidance is illustrated in Kowitz – although Ko-
witz had exhausted her FMLA leave, Trinity still had a duty under the ADA to 
provide her with a reasonable accommodation.151  Trinity was too quick to ter-
minate Kowitz and had failed to determine her rights under the ADA.  Moving 
forward, employers should be cautious when employees request leave or have 
already requested leave and should carefully analyze employees’ rights under 
each statute separately. 
The second lesson of Kowitz is that the timing of the employer’s 
knowledge of the employee’s disability and request for accommodation is crit-
ical.  Perhaps the most damaging fact for Trinity was that it terminated Kowitz 
only one day after receiving her voicemail stating that she needed to complete 
more physical therapy before she could obtain BLS certification.152  Although 
 
 147. Kowitz, 839 F.3d at 747. 
 148. Sullivan, supra note 8, at 119. 
 149. Enforcement Guidance: Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship 
Under the American with Disabilities Act, EEOC (Oct. 17, 2002), 
https://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/accommodation.html [hereinafter Enforcement 
Guidance]. 
 150. Sullivan, supra note 8, at 119. 
 151. Enforcement Guidance, supra note 148.  See Example A: 
 
An employee with an ADA disability needs 13 weeks of leave for treatment 
related to the disability. The employee is eligible under the FMLA for 12 weeks 
of leave (the maximum available), so this period of leave constitutes both 
FMLA leave and a reasonable accommodation. Under the FMLA, the employer 
could deny the employee the thirteenth week of leave. But, because the em-
ployee is also covered under the ADA, the employer cannot deny the request 
for the thirteenth week of leave unless it can show undue hardship. The em-
ployer may consider the impact on its operations caused by the initial 12-week 
absence, along with other undue hardship factors. 
 
Id. 
 152. Kowitz, 839 F.3d at 745. 
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the Eighth Circuit has rejected situations where the employee’s requests for 
accommodation occur after adverse action was already taken,153 the Eighth Cir-
cuit has found that an ADA violation exists if the employee notifies his or her 
employer of the need for accommodation and the employer subsequently takes 
adverse action – such as discharge or discipline – that an accommodation might 
have prevented.154 
Employers considering terminating, disciplining, or taking any adverse 
action against an employee after that employee has requested an accommoda-
tion or has been made aware of the employee’s disability should not act ad-
versely without consulting with a human resource representative or an attorney.  
Furthermore, employers should learn from the mistake of Trinity and not wait 
for employees to make specific requests for accommodation.  Employers 
should engage in good faith communication about whether there is an accom-
modation possible that would enable the employee to continue doing his or her 
job. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The ultimate consequence of an employer failing to engage in the inter-
active process is that the employer may fail to discover an appropriate accom-
modation for the employee’s disability.  The Eighth Circuit’s holding seems 
“employee friendly” as it gives employee-plaintiffs legal leverage in failure-
to-accommodate claims.155  The  holding, however, does not necessarily make 
it more likely that employers will engage in the interactive process.  By reduc-
ing employees’ obligation to communicate their accommodation needs, it is 
less likely that employers will recognize employees’ needs for accommodation.  
The lack of clarity in the law could negatively impact employees with 
disabilities in the long run.  As Judge Colloton stated, “Employers and employ-
ees rely on predictability to make efficient decisions and to avoid costly and 
burdensome litigation.”156  For now, employers should be cautious if they al-
ready know of an employee’s disability or the general nature of an employee’s 
limitations and should not wait for an employee to specifically request an ac-






 153. See Sullivan, supra note 8, at 119. 
 154. Id. (citing Hill v. Kan. City Area Transp. Auth., 181 F.3d 891 (8th Cir. 1999)). 
 155. Because rather than having to prove he or she requested an accommodation, 
an employee only must show that he or she provided “enough information that, under 
the circumstances, the employer can be fairly said to know of both the disability and 
desire for an accommodation.”  Kowitz, 839 F.3d at 748 (quoting Ballard v. Rubin, 284 
F.3d 957, 962 (8th Cir. 2002)). 
 156. Id. at 750 (Colloton, J., dissenting). 
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